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A Reign of Terror in Aceh 
A major report on the grave human rights situation in Aceh has been published by TAPOL. It 
documents the escalation in human rights violations since the army announced the lifting of Aceh 's 
designation as a 'military operations area' in August 1998. Among its many recommendations is a 
call on the Indonesian armed forces and the Free Aceh Movement to end the violence and agree to a 
ceasefire. 
Entitled 'A Reign of Terror: Human Rights Violations 
in Aceh, 1998 - 2000 ',the Report focuses primarily on the 
human rights situation in Aceh following the lifting of DOM 
in August 1998. From 1989 until 1998, Aceh was desig-
nated a military operations area, giving the armed forces 
free rein to inflict massive human rights abuses on the peo-
ple of Aceh. Following the downfall of Suharto in May 
1998, Aceh was awash with complaints about the terrible 
things that had happened, killings, torture, disappearances, 
the raping of women and dozens of subversion trials. The 
revelations shocked the whole country. 
Civil society, with women taking the lead, called for 
DOM to be lifted and for the perpetrators of the abuses to be 
brought to justice. In August 1998. the armed forces com-
mander-in-chief General Wiranto wr.s forced to come to 
Banda Aceh, to offer his apologies and announce the lifting 
of DOM. But nothing changed; in fact, military terror has 
reached a new level of ferocity . While it was estimated by 
Amnesty International, in a report published in 1993, that at 
least two thousand people killed in the three years from 
1989, there were no fewer than 215 deaths in the first ten 
weeks of 2000. with reports of more deaths pouring in every 
day. 
Four periods of escalating terror 
The Report identifies four phases in the eighteen months 
since DOM was lifted. 
Phase One, Intimidation and the Re-Emergence of 
GAM, began immediately after the end of DOM, and was 
characterised by the unexplained killings of a number of 
people thought to have been informants who had helped the 
armed forces during DOM. A group of eight soldiers were 
kidnapped and killed, apparently by GAM, the armed Free 
Aceh Movement, causing the security forces to seek re-
venge. 
Phase Two, Operation Wibawa 99 - Military Massacre 
of Civilians began in January 1999. The ostensible reason 
for the new military operation was to capture an alleged 
GAM leader whose identity was never verified, but it led to 
a number of very grave incidents in which many civilians 
were killed in cold blood. Massacres that occurred from 
February until July 1999 resulted in more than a hundred 
deaths and a much larger number of wounded. Hundreds of 
school buildings were torched and tens of thousands of vil-
lagers fled from their homes and took refuge in camps for 
the internally displaced. Meanwhile, nothing was done, de 
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spite government promises, to bring the men guilty for 
crimes during DOM to justice. Confidence in the Indonesian 
authorities plummeted and grassroots support for GAM 
grew. It was also during this period that students organisa-
tions started to campaign for a referendum, to determine the 
future status of Aceh, either as an autonomous region of 
Indonesia or as an independent state. 
Phase Three, Return to Shock Therapy - Operasi Sadar 
Rencong II covering the last five months of 1999 began in 
August of that year. The strategy of killing dozens of people 
at a time was replaced by one of attrition, with sweepings by 
the armed forces in villages; many people who disappeared 
during these operations were later found dead. GAM opera-
tions also escalated with villagers often being the ones to 
suffer the casualties when the security forces undertook op-
erations against GAM. During this period, civil society was 
in the ascendant with demands for a referendum becoming 
every more persistent. A three-day mass strike occurred in 
August and in November an estimated one million people 
descended on Banda Aceh to attend a rally in favour of a 
referendum. There was a growing sentiment among civilian 
organisations that GAM operations were solving nothing 
and only exacerbating the situation, so the search for a 
peaceful solution intensified. 
Phase Four, Targeting Civilian Activists - Operasi 
Sadar Rencong III began at the end of 1999 and with the 
launching of a new operation in February this year. The po-
lice chief of Aceh, announcing the new operation, said the 
aim was to capture eight hundred GAM acti~ists and sYll!-
pathisers and to adopt a 'much more aggressive approach . 
Many humanitarian workers, human rights defender~, NGO 
activists have been harassed arrested, tortured and m some 
cases, killed. Army raids i~ the countryside ostensi~ly . to 
search for members of GAM have resulted in many c1vihan 
deaths and disappearances. The rape and sexual harassment 
of women has again become a feature. 
Recommendations 
The Report ends with a number of recommendations 
calling on the Indonesian Government to n;spond to the de-
mands of the people of Aceh for full accountability for . past 
human rights abuses, for the creation of ad hoc human nghts 
courts to mete out justice to the perpetrators, for the protec-
tion of witnesses, for compensation and rehabilitation for the 
victims of abuses, and for an end to the harassment and per-
secution of humanitarian activists and human rights defend-
ers. It calls on both sides in the armed struggle to end the 
violence and agree to a ceasefire. It calls on the Indonesian 
government to call a halt to the military operations now un-
derway in Aceh and withdraw all non-organic troops from 
the region including the special police forces, as the prelude 
to withdrawing all organic troops, leaving the security 
situation in the hands of a normal police force. It also ad-
dresses a call on the international community, in particular 
the US and EU governments, to press for the dispatch of UN 
special rapporteurs, in particular those dealing with extra-
judicial killings, disappearances, torture and violence 
against women as well as the UN working group on arbi-
trary detentions. • 
Seeking justice in Aceh getting nowhere 
Last November, a government-appointed commission to investigate human rights abuses in Aceh 
annolf,nced that seven thousand violations had occurred during and after the period of DOM. It rec-
ommended that five prim.ary cases should be taken to court immediately. Nearly half a year later not 
a single trial has taken place. A middle-ranking army officer named as the chief suspect in a massa-
cre case has disappeared, casting the validity of the trial in doubt .. 
The five cases recommended for immediate trial by the 
investigation commission which was set up last July by the 
former President Habibie were: the rape of a woman in 
1996, three massacres which took place in 1999 - at Idi Cut 
on 2 February, in the vicinity of the KKA junction on 3 
May and at the religious school of Tengku Bantaqiah in 
Beutong Ateuh on 23 July - and atrocities committed on a 
continuing basis at the notorious Rumoh Geudong torture 
centre during DOM, the period when Aceh was designated 
as a 'military operations zone' and in particular during 
1997 and 1998. 
Koneksitas courts 
The military in Aceh have, throughout the reign ofter-
ror in Aceh, enjoyed complete impunity. Insofar as any 
trials have taken place anywhere in Indonesia, they have 
been before military courts with lower-ranking offic·ers 
facing charges of 'procedural errors' or 'exceeding orders'. 
The trials have been deliberately framed to protect senior 
officers who ordered the crimes. 
It was decided last year that some of the Aceh trials in-
volving both military and civilian defendants would be 
held in 'inter-connection' or koneksitas courts before a 
panel including civilian and military judges. This was pre-
sented as being a way to ensure greater impartiality. The 
trials moreover were regarded as a top priority in support 
of Jakarta's policy to undermine calls for a referendum 
about Aceh's future status. By finally responding to de-
mands from the Acehnese for accountability for crimes 
against humanity committed since 1989, the central gov-
ernment would dampen pressure from civil society for pos-
sible separation. Speed was therefore essential. Calls by 
human rights activists in Aceh and from TAPOL for these 
trials to be heard before properly constituted ad hoc human 
rights courts have been ignored. 
Under the koneksitas system, the military are also in-
volved in pre-trial interrogations and as members of the 
prosecution team. Events of the past few months have 
shown how they have used this role to effectively sabotage 
court proceedings. 
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Key witness/suspect disappears 
The first case scheduled for trial was the massacre and 
disappearance of more five dozen people in July at the re-
ligious school of Tengku Bantaqiah. When a key witness 
and suspect in the trial disappeared, it placed the proceed-
ings in jeopardy. Lieutenant-colonel Sudjono, intelligence 
chief at the Lilawangsa district command, is believed to 
have led the lethal attack on the school headed by Tengku 
Bantaqiah when he, his first wife and dozens of his pupils 
were killed in cold blood on 23 July 1999.According to the 
findings of a fact-finding mission to Beutong Ateuh, thirty-
one people were gunned down in cold blood and another 
twenty who had witnessed the massacre were subjected to 
severe ill-treatment then taken away and killed. Altogether 
at least 51 people lost their lives on that day while another 
five have since disappeared. Claims by the army that their 
unit acted in self-defence in a gun battle have been hotly 
denied by local inhabitants and refuted by the fact-finding 
mission on the basis of material evidence. 
In February this year, the army announced that Sudjono 
had disappeared. Initially it was said he disappeared in 
mid-January when he failed to return to his unit after being 
given leave but it later became apparent that he disap-
peared in late November last year when he was first under-
going interrogation. Sudjono was slated to appear as the 
chief suspect but he would also have been able to identify 
the line of command which lay behind the massacre, impli-
cating his superiors at the district level or even higher up. 
The army claim that he absconded but it is more likely that 
he has been eliminated and could already be dead. 
The Bantaqiah trial has been plagued with difficulties. 
Originally scheduled to begin in January, it has been post-
poned repeatedly and is now scheduled to open 'in late 
April at the earliest'. There has been confusion over its 
venue; most courts in Aceh no longer function because of 
the grave security situation. The likely venue is now said to 
be the Banda Aceh district court and the police have an-
nounced that one thousand men will be deployed to ensure 
that the trial proceeds without interference.. Then, it was 
reported that the dossiers submitted to the public prosecu-
tor by the interrogation team were rejected as 'incomplete'. 
The final irony was that lack of funds have apparently 
delayed the proceedings. In a highly unusual move, the 
authorities said the recently-established ministry of human 
rights should foot the bill. The minister, Hasballah M. 
Saad, who is himself Acehnese and who has pushed hard-
est to get the trial started, responded, saying his ministry 
has hardly enough money to run its own affairs, let alone to 
pay for the trial. 
The koneksitas mechanism means that the military are 
in a strategic position to sabotage the proceedings at all 
stages. 
A group of relatives and pupils of the murdered relig-
ious teacher, including his second wife, came to Jakarta in 
March, seeking protection. They said that their homes situ-
ated near the site of the massacre are now difficult to ap-
proach because of the presence of armed security forces 
who have set up command posts on all of the approach 
roads. 
Rape victim under pressure 
Another trial which may soon be held concerns the 
rape of a crippled woman named Sumiyati Hamzah, who 
was raped by a member of the security forces in August 
1996. She subsequently gave birth resulting from the rape. 
She was taken from her home by army officers from the 
local military command on 12 March. Although it was 
feared at the time that she had disappeared, it later emerged 
that she had been taken to a military command in Medan 
where she may have been put under pressure about her 
evidence. This trial, if and when it happens, will be heard 
by a military court. 
Sumiyati Hamzah is an orphan. She walks with great 
difficulty because both her legs are deformed. The rapist 
was a member of Battalion 126 which was stationed in her 
village, Peumanah, Trieng Gadeng, Pidie. After giving 
birth, she went to Tebing Tinggi where the man's unit had 
been re-located. The rapist confessed to the crime in the 
presence of his commander. Yet, he has never been disci-
plined and is now on a another tour of duty in Aceh, in 
Kampong Tiro. 
Sumiyati's vulnerability and the representations by 
relatives of the murdered religious leader, focus attention 
on the lack of protection for witnesses in a region where 
lawlessness prevails. 
T APOL calls for ad hoc court 
In a letter addressed to the human rights minister on 7 
March, T APOL called on him to acknowledge that the only 
way to proceed with human rights trials in Aceh was to 
abandon the koneksitas system and press for the creation of 
a properly-constituted ad hoc human rights court. In its 
letter, it argued that: 
* Persons suspected of gross human rights abuses or 
crimes against humanity cannot be tried in courts that are 
only empowered to try persons for ordinary crimes under 
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ACEH 
No respite in Aceh killings 
The human rights situation in Aceh has continued to deteriorate, and has worsened even since TA-
POL published its report, 'A Reign of Terror' in late March. The contradiction between central gov-
ernment and military policy became glaringly obvious from events surrounding a meeting between a 
government envoy and the GAM commander in North Aceh. Meanwhile efforts to water down civil 
society's calls for a peaceful solution continue apace. 
There has been a great deal of talk about the need for 
face to face negotiations with Tengku Hasan di Tiro, to 
reach an agreement on ending the violence. Hasan di Tiro 
is regarded as the acknowledged leader of GAM, the Free 
Aceh Movement, whose forces have been keeping up sus-
tained military operations in most parts of Aceh throughout 
1999. He fled Aceh in the late 1970s and has been based in 
Sweden now for many years. Although he was seriously ill 
a few years ago, claims that he is incapacitated are clearly 
wide of the mark. He or members of his entourage are 
known to have been involved in 'proximity talks' in Ge-
neva, brokered by a Geneva-based conflict-resolution or-
ganisation. 
Jakarta envoy meets GAM commander 
On 16 March, a meeting that could have been a break-
through took place been Bondan Gunawan, the recently 
appointed secretary of state and a trusted associate of 
President Abdurrahman Wahid, and Abdullah Syafi'ie, the 
acknowledged leader in the field of GAM forces. 
When Bondan introduced himself to Syafi' ie as the en-
voy from the central government, the commander was 
clearly taken aback and said he had no authority to engage 
in official talks. Tensions quickly relaxed when the two 
men agreed to talk just as individuals. Remarks were ex-
changed about the need to end the violence but during the 
twenty-minute encounter, little more was achieved. 
Reports that later appeared in the Indonesian press 
claimed that according to Bondan, Syafi'ie acknowledged 
the viability of Aceh becoming part of a federal state, but a 
representative of one of Aceh's leading NGOs, Cordova, 
who was present during the encounter, said this was a mis-
representation. 
On his way to the venue in Pidie, Bondan had to pass 
through heavily militarised territory and later remarked that 
he had found the experience quite terrifying. According to 
an observer who was present at the encounter, Bondan had 
to pass through army or police checkpoints at every com-
mand post, all manned by heavily-armed personnel direct-
ing their weapons towards the local people. On his return, 
he sought and was given assurances from the regional 
military commander that the security forces would not take 
retaliatory actions against the local inhabitants. However, 
this pledge was not honoured. 
Four villages raided 
At 3am the following morning, security forces arrived 
in the sub-district of Teupin Raya, near to the meeting 
place; they fanned out in all directions and raided four vil-
lages. Villagers were ordered out of their homes, the iden-
tity cards were checked and they were asked to reveal the 
whereabouts of the GAM commander. A number of villag-
ers were beaten black and blue for failing to answer coher-
ently, and several men needed treatment in a nearby medi-
cal centre for their injuries. 
Initially, the local military command denied that these 
raids had occurred but the facts, which had been reported 
fully in the Jakarta daily Kompas [18 March] whose re-
porter arrived on the scene later the same day, were irrefu-
table. President Wahid ordered an investigation and sug-
gested that the raids were the work of 'rogue elements'. , 
It is difficult to assess the degree to which this effort to 
reach agreement may have retarded efforts to reach any 
agreement on a ceasefire. Certainly, civil society as repre-
sented by the students and other NGOs condemned the 
inability of the government in Jakarta to assert its control 
over the security forces in the region. 
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ICRC alarmed 
The International Red Cross (ICRC), a body which is 
normally very reticent about making public pronounce-
?1ents, is clearly alarmed about the human rights situation 
m Aceh. Despite recent claims by President Wahid that the 
situation in Aceh is improving, Paul Grossrieder, direct-
general of the ICRC said the violence is 'as bad as ever' 
with torture and murder a common occurrence. 
He described the situation in Aceh as 'very critical'. 
Speaking to the press in Jakarta after a ten-day visit to 
Aceh, he said their delegates on the spot 
'have .. .indications of disappearances, missing people, 
groups being killed. We are seeing people who are left on 
the ground, killed, hands detached.' He said up to 30 peo-
ple every week asked the Red Cross for assistance in trac-
ing family members who have disappeared. Most aren't 
found. [AP, 14 March] 
With reports being received every day about more kill-
ings or the discovery of the bodies of persons who had 
been reported missing, it is impossible to give any reliable 
figures. The death rate in Aceh since the beginning of 2000 
is at least 300, of whom the vast majority are civilians. 
A typical case is that of Faridah, a 23-year old univer-
sity student from UNIMA university, Lhokseumawe, who 
was accosted on 15 March with her uncle by an unknown 
assailant near the village of Manyang Cut, subdistrict 
Meureudu, Pidie, on her way home from market, by a man 
on a motorbike. He opened fire, killing her instantly while 
her uncle escaped death by fleeing the scene. Faridah's 
death was the second tragedy to have struck her family, as 
her father, M Gade Basyah, aged 70, was attacked in the 
family home three weeks earlier by an unknown assailant 
and shot dead. [Serambi Indonesia, 16 March] 
A number of rapes have also occurred. On one recent 
occasion, troops raided three villages in the North Aceh 
subdistrict of Matangkuli on 7 March and raped three 
women. Many other women were subjected to sexual har-
assment. Houses were looted and jewelry and money sto-
len, according to a report from the women's division of 
Cordova. [23 March] 
Undermining civil society 
The need for a referendum is still strong in Aceh though 
it has been subsumed by the level of violence and the need 
for human rights and humanitarian activists to focus all 
their attention on monitoring atrocities and avoiding being 
arrested or worse. Taking advantage of such a complex and 
difficult situation, the authorities are now concentrating on 
organising a Kongres Rakyat Aceh in late April at which 
they hope to bring together more than a thousand people. 
The organisers are coordinating their preparations with 
the central government and have sought and obtained as-
surances from the national chief of police that the event 
will be strongly protected by the police. Since the police 
are themselves at the forefront of the current military op-
eration in Jakarta, code-named Operasi Sadar Rencong III 
(Operation Rencong Aware, rencong being a traditional 
Acehnese knife), it would surely be more appropriate for 
the organisers of the gathering to can on the police to halt 
these operations which are the cause of so much of the 
violence. The need for police protection compares with the 
one-million strong rally held in Banda Aceh on 8 Novem-
ber last year when the security forces were conspicuous by 
their absence, thus assuring that the event passed off peace-
fully, thanks to the stewarding efforts of activists from 
SIRA (Aceh Referendum Information Centre). 
It is being said that all subdistricts throughout the 
province will be represented at the congress by four people 
each, but local NGOs are highly sceptical about the way in 
which these 'representatives' will be selected. 
It is also clear that Washington it heavily involved in 
ensuring the successful outcome of this event. The head of 
the New York-based International Forum for Aceh, Jaffar 
Siddiq, on a visit to the US capital in March, found himself 
being pressed hard by the State Department official he met 
to support this initiative. Some months ago during a visit to 
the US by President Wahid, Washington pledged full sup-
port for Jakarta's determination to avoid any moves to-
ward~ separatism in Aceh. One of their key concerns is 
certamly the fate of the US oil company operating in Aceh 
Mobile Oil. ' 
A major women's conference held in February was also 
under strong pressure to avoid supporting a referendum. 
The conference, attended by 400 women from the twelve 
districts of ~ceh, adopted decisions on the position of 
women under Islamic law, their position in political and 
economic affairs, and the question of human rights. Among 
the resolutions adopted were a call for a ceasefire and for 
the withdrawal of non-organic security forces. But the most 
controversial issue was whether to adopt a decision on a 
referendum. After seven hours of heated debate and a 
walk-out by pro-referendum participants, it was decided 
not to comment on the issue. Both sides in the argument 
~aid that they had been s~bjected to fierce outside pressure, 
~n some case.s acc~mpamed by death threats. [See separate 
item for an mterv1ew of one of Aceh's foremost women 
activists.] * 
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Defending women's rights in Aceh 
Women in Aceh have been in the forefront exposing the atrocities committed in Aceh during the last 
decade of the Suharto era,. They are also among their most harassed victims. Flower Aceh cam-
paigns on their behalf and co-ordinates volunteers who visit refugee camps. Suraiya Kamaruz-
zaman, the founder of Flower Aceh, spoke to Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL when they met at a con-
ference in Amsterdam in December. 
What is it that prompted you to set up Flower Aceh 
and to start speaking out on behalf of the victims of hu-
man rights abuses? 
I helped to set up Flower in 1989. I was 21 years old at 
the time. In those days, it focused on women' s issues, repro-
ductive rights and helping women to set up small businesses 
as a way of ensuring their independence. 
In 1992, I was on a job training course at Mobil Oil as 
part of my studies at the faculty of chemical technology. I 
used to return home at weekends, travelling from Lhokseu-
mawe to Banda Aceh and I discovered that there were many 
corpses lying in the mountainous area through which I trav-
elled, along the roads or down ravines . I soon realised that 
local people were terrified and didn't dare to say anything 
about what was happening. I was told that parents were 
telling their children, especially their sons, not to return 
home during the vacations, for fear of being killed. So we 
began to tum our attention to monitoring these atrociti,es. 
Some time later, I went to Jakarta to attend a workshop 
on feminist perspectives and I was shocked to discover that 
no one there had the slightest notion of what was going on in 
Aceh. Information was being hidden because people were 
too afraid to talk to outsiders, especially to foreigners . If you 
spoke to foreigners, military intelligence agents would check 
up on you afterwards with dangerous consequences. 
But over the years, our volunteers have collected many ·. 
photos and evidence. We have photos of soldiers holding 
people with guns pointed at their heads, soldiers holding up 
the severed heads of their victims, and we have detailed in-
formation about the perpetrators of many atrocities . 
Were you aware in those days that Aceh was a 
'military operation zone' or DOM? We abroad never 
heard that term used until after Suharto was removed 
from power. 
We didn't hear it either. What we knew was that there 
were frequent military operations. They were called Jaring 
Merah (Red Net). They happened in phases, Red Net I, II, 
III and IV, conducted by the military. 
After Suharto stepped down, there were demands for 
DOM to be lifted. It was the time of reformasi and the stu-
dents began to organise themselves . And people started to 
come forward, especially the women, to talk about the terri-
ble abuses they had suffered. Many student organisations 
and NGOs came into existence. The local government also 
got involved in collecting information about the human 
rights abuses. They co-opted some of the NGOs, hoping to 
Suraiya Kamaruzzaman in Amsterdam 
ensure that they would toe the government line. False NGOs 
were also set up. Some activists, myself included, found 
themselves being accused of all kinds of things. A rumour 
started to circulate that I was in the pay of military intelli-
gence. The intention was to discredit us in the eyes of the 
people and to set us against each other, to create what we 
call 'horizontal conflicts', but it didn't work 
In what way has Flower Aceh campaigned on behalf 
of women? 
One of our most difficult campaigns has been to speak 
out on behalf of women who have been raped. This is a 
quite common occurrence but it's difficult to press for the 
rapists to be punished. In 1997, a villager complained that 
sh~ had been raped by the. village chief. There was plenty of 
ev~dence to prove that this was true; people living nearby 
said that they had heard her scream. We decided to take this 
case to court and have the rapist charged. The man was ac-
tually he~d for. five months but no one dared to testify in 
court agamst him although he had plenty of friends speaking 
in his defence. In the end, the case was dropped. I wrote to 
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MUI, the ulamas' council, urging them to condemn this and 
protect women against this crime, but they were not pre-
pared to accept the victim' s evidence. The first issue of our 
Flower Aceh newsletter wad devoted to discussing this case. 
President Wahid now says that if the people of Aceh 
want a referendum, he will allow you to vote on whether 
you want Syariah Law in Aceh. This isn't what the ref-
erendum campaign is about is it? How did this idea 
emerge? 
Before Gus Dur took over as president, President 
Habibie had a lot of trouble with Aceh during his years in 
office. He set up a special team to work out a strategy. The 
head of the team was Usman Hasan and he came up with 
this idea of adopting Syariah Law in Aceh. It was supported 
by MUI but not by the rest of us. 
Another idea they had was to enact a Law on Special 
Autonomy for Aceh, Law 44/1999. The law has been passed 
but for a long time, it was very difficult to get a copy of the 
law. The law states that Aceh will take control in four areas 
- education; religion, traditional law and increasing the role 
of the local ulamas. As a matter of fact, Aceh is supposed to 
have had special autonomy since 1957. The new law adds 
nothing to what was granted before except for the fourth 
point about the ulamas. The government says it will also 
introduce a law allocating 75 per cent of the wealth pro-
duced by Aceh to us. 
I have seen several reports recently about Acehnese 
women being required to wear ajilhah (head cover). Is 
there a regulation like this? 
No, there isn't, but many people are talking as if there 
was. Recently, huge banners were hung in front of the 
Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh, written in Indonesian, Ara-
bic and Acehnese, saying that women must wear head cov-
ers. There is no such law but this is being promoted as a 
distraction from the real issues, bringing human rights vio-
lators to account and holding a referendum. 
There have been many instances where women have 
been attacked for not wearing a jilbab. There have been 
raids in the streets against women whose heads are uncov-
ered and some have even had their hair shaved off. Sad to 
say some women do this kind of thing. My organisation bec~e so concerned about this that we held a press confer-
ence on 4 October 1999. We said that wearing a jilbab is a 
personal matter and the ~tate hi:~s no right to interfere ~d 
make it compulsory. While makmg so much fuss about]ll-
bab, the authorities do absolutely nothing to protect women 
against acts of violence like rape. 
Strange to say, it's far more difficult for people to speak 
out on the jilbab issue than to protest about the presence of 
the military. When we protest about the jilbab, we are ac-
cused of being anti-Islam and that gets you into real trouble! 
Aceh is not like Ambon where there are two distinct re-
ligious communities, so they h~ve to create. horizontal con-
flicts along different lines, settmg men agamst women and 
even women against women. 
Why are women being harassed in this way? 
Well, Acehnese women have always played a very mil~ 
tant role. During the Acehnese War at the end of the 19 
century, they even occupied positions of command. Under 
Suharto, they were heavily suppressed but after DOM was 
lifted, the women were the ones who spoke out first and 
most courageously. 
This is seen as being the way to undermine civil society. 
The question of how women dress and what they do is be-
coming the main issue. It's now being said that women 
shouldn't be allowed to teach gymnastics and physical edu-
cation in school. 
What will you be doing when you return home? 
I'll go back to monitoring conditions in the refugee 
camps. This often gets us into hot water, you know, be~au~e 
the security forces accuse us of being pro-GAM which is 
absolute rubbish. 
Just before I left for Holland, there was an attempt by 
some men to burn down one of the camps that had been set 
up in the vicinity of a mosque. The man involved was 
caught. He was thoroughly searched and a Kopassus card 
was found in his trouser pocket, showing he was in fact from 
the army. We handed him over to the security forces, to the 
police and he was sent to Jakarta but we never heard what 
happened to him afterwards. 
Thank you for sharing your experiences with me. • 
New documentary on East Timor 
Scenes from an Occupation: 
Synopsis: 
"They killed a child. The adults came out of their houses 
and said, kill us, not innocent children'. They came out, 
praying and shouting. That's when they machine gunned the 
adults." 
This documentary is an intimate account of the last six 
months of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. Filmmaker 
Carmela Baranowska is the only person to have documented 
this period. She first travelled to East Timor in March 1999, 
working as a one person crew and stayed on until the UN 
evacuated its compound in September 1999. 
"Scenes from an Occupation" is an observational film 
closely aligned to the East Timorese people and the events 
which unfolded. The footage includes eyewitness accounts 
of the role the Indonesian military played in a systematic 
campaign of destruction, murder and terror. "We may all 
die", says an East Timorese woman, "but if one is left, he 
will tell the story". 
This film is a testament to the East Timorese people's 
courage, strength and determination to gain their independ-
ence. 
Viagem Films 
PO BOX 5068 
Laburnum 3130 VIC 
Australia 
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Impressions of East Timor 
For three weeks in December and January, I was able for the first time ever to visit East Timor. I 
had been invited to be one of the facilitators for a media course but this visit provided me with an 
excellent opportunity to learn about East Timor at this new phase of its history and to meet old 
friends. Here are my impressions. 
I had been prepared for the worst. I knew of the destruc-
tion that had been wrought on the country as the forces of 
occupation withdrew in a fit of wrath and vengeance. Hav-
ing been involved in solidarity work for East Timer since 
1975, it has become part of my daily routine to follow the 
situation there closely. Being in East Timar has a kind of 
familiarity for me. Not only because the many people I 
know but also all the places I visit always has the historic 
connection with a certain moment or incident in the past two 
decades. 
Arriving at Comoro airport in Dili 
. Bad as things were, I soon realised that not quite every-
thmg had been destroyed, not so bad for instance as the dev-
astation the Russian army has inflicted on Grozny. Several 
neighbourhoods of Dili have been left unscathed or only 
partly destroyed. By comparison, when the Dutch left Indo-
nesia in the late 1940s, the Republic's new elite had plenty 
of finely-furnished houses for them to occupy and claim as 
their own. 
During my stay in Dili, I was accommodated in a house 
that had formerly been the home of AURI (the Indonesian 
Air Force) officers, which is now home to several East 
T imorese families as well as being the meeting point for 
media activists . It was in the leafy area of Farol a rather 
grand, colonial-style house built during the Portu~ese era. 
Stripped of all its furnishings, conditions were very basic, 
sleepmg on the floor on mats, but it was a great pleasure for 
me to bask in the warmth and generous hospitality of my 
East Timorese friends . 
Now that the Indonesian occupation has ended, East 
Timorese walk with a light step and a smile on their face. It 
was such a pleasure to celebrate Christmas without the pres-
ence of the dreaded Indonesian army. But Dili was still 
heavily militarised because of the overwhelming presence of 
INTERFET troops. I had the impression that the troops had 
nothing much to do in Dili so they engaged in unnecessary 
manoeuvres in the streets. Almost every day, there were 
tanks rolling in the streets and helicopters droning over the 
houses, much to everyone's annoyance. 
No institutions 
There is something almost surreal about living in a 
newly liberated country where nothing that we normally 
associate with modem living exists. When I arrived at the 
airport, there were no immigration officers to pester me (this 
has since changed). There were no local police officers no 
public services, no local laws, no shops, no newspa~ers, 
practically nothing was there. One only realises what this 
means when you are confronted with such a situation. 
There's nowhere to go shopping, no supermarket, no de-
partment store or comer shop, as they say in London. This 
creates its own problems. Even for a tablet to cure a head-
ache you have to go to a clinic or hospital and buying a light 
bulb can mean searching for hours. 
In the weeks that I was there, a very basic market econ-
omy was slowly coming back to life. At the central market 
i~ Dili, small traders or farmers were selling a few products 
hke vegetables and fruit (they were better than anything I 
had ever tasted). Street vendors were beginning to emerge 
mostly selling fresh vegetables. A few restaurants had 
(re )opened as well as some cigarette kiosks, mostly selling 
the Indonesi~ clove cigarettes which are very popular 
~ong the T~morese . But with everything in short supply, 
pnces had sptralled beyond the reach of the vast majority of 
East Timorese. 
Another strange experience was living in a city without 
laws and regulations. There was plenty of traffic but no 
traffic police. The ~uge i~ux of vehicles belonging to the 
~ ~d the many mtemattonal NGOs is perhaps the most 
stnking symbol of East Timor in transition. Brand new cars 
were to be seen everywhere, all sporting their own license 
plates, Australian, Portuguese, British, Canadian, and with 
plenty of Indonesian licence plates as well. The Indonesian 
presenc~ was still visible everywhere, on billboards and 
bo~ds m front of.buildings that until recently had been oc-
cupied by Indonesian organisations and offices. 
As always, there is a positive side to all this · electricity ~as bee~ restored in Dili and is free (for the mom~nt) though 
it d~esn t always work, and there were quite a few blackouts 
durmg my short stay. 
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While I was there, the UN started to set up a rudimen-
tary court system and twenty East Timorese law graduates, 
all from Indonesian universities, were given a crash course 
on how to run the transitional judiciary. The new law offi-
cials will hopefully fill the gap of uncertainty, building up a 
set of criteria for arresting and interrogating people. A sense 
of justice needs to be established, in particular to deal with 
those who were involved in militia gangs. 
There was (and still is) no such thing as a civil service. It 
was not clear to me how such basic things as getting married 
or what kind of travel document the East Timorese will get 
in this transitional period. Public transport, which is pri-
vately run as in many parts of Asia, was functioning but 
public services like the post and garbage collection were 
not. There was no phone service and UN and NGO officials 
relied on Australian hand-phones powerful enough to reach 
Dili. 
But these are trivial as compared to the much vaster 
problem for the UN, creating from scratch some of the es-
sential institutions such as a country-wide fiscal authority, a 
banking system and a civil service. 
Timor Loro Sae is at the cross-roads on the way to full 
independence. The administration is a hybrid, run by the UN 
in consultation with the East Timorese, with the latter being 
much less than a junior partner. The UN has been given the 
task, within these two years, of creating optimal conditions 
for the East Timorese to run an independent country but as 
far as I could see, the imbalance between the two was cre-
ating its own difficulties and causing resentment and frus-
tration among local people. 
Emergency situation 
The first year of the new millennium has been declared 
by CNR T, the East Timorese political umbrella, as the year 
of emergency, the year in which solving the humanitarian 
crisis in East Timor is the top priority. The humanitarian 
crisis covers absolutely everything, food, shelter, security, 
electricity, water, education and health care. Each of these 
sectors is fraught with problems. 
Early on, the CNRT set an emergency taskforce but it 
soon became apparent that there would be many practical as 
well as structural problems. During the weeks I was in East 
Timor, two important meetings were held. One was betwe~n 
the CNRT and the big international NGOs (BINGOs) m 
Dili on 17 December. On the previous day in Tokyo, 
twenty-four East Timorese NGOs had a meeting with 
twenty NGOs from all parts of the world. On both occa-
sions, the wishes and grievances of the East Timorese were 
addressed. 
The East Timorese are deeply worried that during this 
transitional period, a dual economy is coming into being 
with negative consequences for the population. They fear 
that most of the attention will be on urban development at 
the expense of the rural sector, and that there will be a dis-
parity between administrative costs and the development 
budgets of the UN and BINGOs. 
The grassroots activists with whom I spent much of my 
time want the emergency phase to be as brief as possible 
and to give way to the development phase. Experience 
around the world shows that emergency aid creates a culture 
of dependency and promotes negative attitudes regarding 
such important principles as food self-reliance and recon 
EASTTIMOR 
struction. Everything that I heard during my short visit and 
since leads me to the regrettable conclusion that the emer 
gency phase now underway in East Timor is fundamentally 
flawed because it excludes that critical element which was 
so important during the country's resistance to the forces ~f 
occupation, the participation of the people. The UN pays hp 
service to this principle of participation when it speaks of 
' ... organised efforts to increase control over resources and 
regulative institutions in given social conditions, on the 
part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded 
from such control'. 
The more radical activists had come to the conclusion 
that, after three months, the UN/BINGO system had failed 
to involve the population in the task of reconstruction. 
The UN and the BINGOs 
In an attempt to reverse the lack of people's participa-
tion, the CNR T leadership has stressed the importance of 
. partnership with the transitional UN administration but day 
to day experience shows that 'partnership' usually means 
nothing more than being consulted. Many of the BINGOs 
lack a basic knowledge of East Timor. I discovered that 
some of their officials knew nothing about the flourishing 
network of local NGOs and some didn't even know who 
Xanana Gusmao was. The BINGOs complain about the un-
willingness of East Timorese to attend their meetings but it 
is often understandable that the East Timorese doesn't want 
to get involved in the bureaucracy and intricacies of the 
BINGOs. 
This warped understanding is reflected in an unwilling-
ness to co-operate with Timorese organisations. Initially 
OCHA, the co-ordinating body of UN humanitarian agen-
cies, refused to liaise with the CNRT and only wanted to 
work with the Catholic Church in their relief activities. 
Whatever its weaknesses, having been so heavily persecuted 
during the months leading up to last August's ballot, the 
CNRT is often the only political structure in the village; the 
CNRT should under no circumstances be ignored in the dis-
tribution of relief. Things have improved but there is another 
stumbling block, the lack of co-ordination between the UN 
and the BINGOs or in between the BINGOs. 
Remnants of militia/TN/ violence: graffiti expressing death 
threats towards Xanana Gusmao 
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Another delica~ matter is the extent to which East 
Timorese are employed by the UN and the BINGOs. With 
most staff positions already filled by foreigners , the only 
vacancies left for East Timorese are unskilled, low-paid 
jobs. UN and BINGO officials are highly paid and enjoy a 
very different standard of living from the East Timorese, 
which has given birth to a dualistic economy with all the 
dangers of social envy and incitement to petty crime. This 
has had a negative impact on the growth of East Timorese 
NGOs and on East Timorese civil society in general. While 
local NGOs lack everything, even the most basic office 
equipment such as paper, pens and pencils, staplers and en-
velopes, not to speak of office space, computers and photo-
copiers, their well-endowed international counterparts have 
everything in abundance. But many East Timorese intellec-
tuals and activists have turned down jobs on offer by the UN 
and the BINGOs, even though this would transform their 
economic circumstances, preferring to work with their local 
groups and devoting their energies to strengthening civil 
society which they see as being incompatible with working 
in a UN/BINGO environment. 
The UN hopes to wind up its role in East Tim.or within 
two years although that could be extended if the basic 
structures are not yet in place. It has drafted concrete plans 
for reconstruction but the wheels of the UN tum very 
slowly. In the three weeks I was there, I saw nothing that 
could be remotely described as reconstruction. Even now, 
much needed building material and equipment have not ar-
rived and people are still unable to start rebuilding their de-
stroyed homes and schools. 
Many of the UN personnel I spoke to were aware of the 
problems and agreed that it is difficult to get things done in 
East Tim.or. A major problem is the lack of funds . Only one 
third of the money pledged by the international community 
to help East Timor has been forthcoming so far. 
Unresolved problems 
One major unresolved problem relates to the return of 
refugees from West Tim.or and other parts of Indonesia. I 
soon realised that part of the problem lies within East 
Timor. I met many East Timorese who had recently returned 
home from refugee camps in the interior of East Timor or in 
West Tim.or. 
The refugees in West Tim.or confront a complex situation 
with many being trapped in camps that remain under the 
control of militia gangs. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 156, Feb-
ruary 2000] But there are many who are reluctant to return 
home for the time being for a variety of reasons, including 
the fear of reprisals from the population. There have been 
instances when people who returned home were beaten up 
by the population. Feelings of anger still run deep among the 
East Timorese for the terrible destruction wrought on their 
villages and homes, for which they hold the army-backed 
militias responsible. Many of the people who return from 
West Tim.or are eyed with suspicion while the lack of any 
authority or accountability for these crimes only aggravates 
the problem. Several hundred returnees have sought protec-
tion from the Falintil forces in Aileu. 
One incident during my stay involved a group of Indone-
sian refugees who had arrived back in Dili from West 
Tim.or. They had lived in East Tim.or for several decades and 
had come to regard East Tim.or as their home. Mi.sunder-
standings and feelings of resentment among East T imorese 
led to an outburst of anger in the neighbourhood where they 
were re-settled but fortunately Jose Ramos-Horta was on 
hand to talk to the East Timorese and persuade them to re-
ceive the new arrivals back as friends and the incident ended 
happily. 
Another grave problem is health and the availability of 
medical services. For many years, tuberculosis and malaria 
have been major killers in East Tim.or. Living for months in 
close proximity in refugee camps caused the incidence of TB 
to intensify, while the many unfilled ditches and empty 
houses have become the breeding ground during the rainy 
season for mosquitoes, spreading malaria and dengue fever. 
Although a number of medical teams had arrived from vari-
ous parts of the world, the state of health of the population is 
still very poor. I saw many very sick people wherever I 
went, East Timorese and foreigners alike. Almost everyone 
in the house where I was staying came down with something 
or other. Darwin has become a relief post for the very sick, 
mostly foreigners, and I was told that there were more than a 
thousand people from Eas't Timor being treated there. 
TheCNRT 
The CNRT is the only East Timorese political organisa-
tion which has a presence down to the villages. Despite its 
many problems, it is impressive to see that it has been able 
to mobilise the population to a considerable degree. But 
certain internal weaknesses had already begun to emerge in 
the early months of the emergency. By its very nature, the 
CNRT is a joint political platform consisting of groups and 
individuals with different political persuasions which has 
made it difficult structurally to adopt united positions on a 
number of burning issues. 
UN officials have been known to complain that CNRT 
leaders take different positions on some issues. It is unlikely 
to expect this fragile unity to improve in the coming months, 
especially as general elections are due to be held in East 
Timor within two years. This means that the several political 
strands in the CNR T are bound to go their own way, 
emerging as distinct political parties. A new political map is 
already beginning to emerge, reflecting the transformation 
of East Tim.or into a pluralist society. While the old parties 
like Fretilin, UDT and Apodeti will take their rightful place, 
other parties are certain to appear, adding to the mosaic en-
riching East Timor's post-colonial era. One party that has 
already emerged is the PST, the Socialist Party of Timor, 
which is represented on the transitional leadership of the 
CNR T administration. It is questionable whether the many 
activists will feel at home in any of the political groupings. I 
do believe many will remain active in their respective NGO 
constituencies. 
The CNR T's president and vice-president, Xanana 
Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta, are enormously popular. 
Indeed, the East Timorese are lucky to have such experi-
enced, impressive leaders. But at the same time the CNRT 
leadership has failed as yet to recruit new blo~d from the 
hundreds of activists who did so much to keep the resistance 
alive under conditions of clandestinity during the final years 
of the Indonesian occupation, both in East Timor and Indo-
nesia. M~y of the second echelon CNRT leaders originate 
from the diaspora, mostly from Australia and Portugal, and 
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an uneasy relationship now exists between former clandes-
tine cadres and leaders from the diaspora. The decision to 
adopt Portugu~se as the official language hasn't helped to 
bridge the gap; this is not the language of the younger gen-
eration of East Timorese who speak Indonesian fluently but 
mostly struggle with Portuguese. The extensive use of Indo-
nesian made it easy for me to communicate with almost eve-
ryone I met and to get a clearer picture of the present situa-
tion. 
Civil society 
In the difficult days of the Indonesian occupation, the 
Catholic Church played a critically important role in pro-
tecting and organising the people but now, things have 
changed. Of course, the role of the church is still important. 
I attended traditional masses at Christmas and New Year 
with thousands of people present. But these days, Bishop 
Ximenes Belo is much less prominent as a public figure than 
during the Indonesian occupation. 
An incident during New Year's Eve celebrations in front 
of the former governor's office drew attention to a rather 
awkward clash of traditions. A big party had been organised 
by INTERFET and the CNRT to entertain the troops and the 
population, but this clashes with the tradition of going to 
midnight mass. Some angry church activists grabbed the 
mike and urged the crowd to go the church but most people 
stayed. 
In public affairs, it is now the CNRT rather than the 
Church which organises the people politically while local 
NGOs are building a vibrant civil society. With time, the 
Church and its many followers will surely fit into this 
changed milieu. 
During the media training I had been invited to assist, I 
was deeply moved by the boundless enthusiasm of the par-
ticipants, eager to start up a range of media outlets. The 
moment the facilities are available, radio programmes, 
newspapers and magazines will begin to appear. At the end 
of the media course, the participants announced the estab-
lishment of a Timor Loro Sae Journalists' Association, with 
mainstream and activist journalists joining forces in the new 
association. 
NGO activists across the board have been quick off the 
mark. The impressive Yayasan Hak is continuing with its 
human rights work while others have come into existence, a 
Commission for Human Rights, women's organisations as 
well as wide range of other NGOs. 
During my stay I also attended a public gathering or-
ganised by Yayasan Hak to greet the home-coming of the 
last batch of East Timorese political prisoners. The seven-
teen ex-prisoners, all staunch freedom fighters spent many 
years in prisons in Indonesia, accused of terrorism and other 
acts of subversion. It reminds me of South Africa where 
many top leaders have also spent many years in prison be-
cause of their conviction. It was an emotional meeting, 
opened by Xanana Gusmao, an ex-political prisoner himself. 
The youth of East Timor are also finding their own place 
in civil society. A new group called Forum Demokrasi al-
ready exists with clear left-wing credentials. The more es-
tablished youth and student organisations like Renetil, Oj~til 
and Solidaritas Mahasiswa have also begun to re-orgaruse 
themselves. 
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During the media· training in Dili 
During my stay, preparations for the Renetil congress 
were under way. Many Rene ti I activists played an important 
role during their years of study at Indonesian universities, 
promoting the issue of East Timor to the outside world. Over 
the years, T APOL worked closely with these activists and ~t 
was thrilling to be there among old friends, sharing their 
enthusiasm. I was privileged to be able to attend several 
preparatory meetings along with hundreds of participants. 
One of the options considered was for Renetil to become a 
political party but it was decided at the congress in January 
to continue as a mass organisation, functioning also as a 
political watchdog. The existence of organisations like Re-
netil is a guarantee that East Timorese civil society will re-
main vibrant and alert, bridging the gap between the popu-
lation and the UN/BINGOs. 
Having been a campaigner for so many years, I realise 
how much East Timor has changed. The international soli-
darity movement for East Timor must come to terms with 
this new situation. Dozens of activists have already become 
involved in helping the reconstruction of the country. Others 
have drawn the conclusion that now that the main task, the 
right of self determination, has been achieved, their future 
role in solidarity with East Timor will need to be adjusted. I 
believe that the time has come to reconsider the strategy. 
Liem Soei Liong 
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RIGHTS TRIALS 
Human rights court to be established 
A draft bill for the creation of a human rights court has been finalised and has been submitted to 
the Indonesian parliament, the DPR. If enacted, this will be a major advance towards ending the cy-
cle of impunity in Indonesia. Many analysts abroad are pessimistic that this can happen in short 
term and demand an international court for the crimes committed in East Timor in 1999. 
It has taken months for the drafting committee composed 
of lawyers, government officials and human rights activists 
to agree on a bill that would make it possible for past crimes 
against humanity to be tried in courts with the necessary 
powers to try grave human rights abuses while not infring-
ing the key principle of non-retroactivity that underpins the 
legal system. The modus reached was for the new law to set 
up a permanent human rights court without retroactive pow-
ers, while enabling the president to set up ad hoc courts with 
similar powers to try specific past crimes. 
Countless crimes committed during the 33 years of the 
Suharto dictatorship are now queuing up to be investigated 
and taken to court. They include: the massacre of hundreds 
of Muslims in Tanjung Priok, near Jakarta in September 
1984, the attack on the head office of the Indonesian De-
mocracy Party headed by Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 
1996, the multiple atrocities perpetrated against the people 
of Aceh from 1989 - 1998 and subsequently, and the orgy of 
violence that struck East Timar before and after the ballot 
on 30 August 1999 when more than 78 per cent of East 
Timorese voted for independence. 
Crimes against humanity becomes law 
The new law inscribes into law a number of gross or 
extraordinary crimes as defined under international hu-
manitarian law which until now have not been indictable 
under Indonesia's Criminal Code. These include the crimes 
of genocide, enforced disappearances, slavery and torture, in 
all cases as defined in international conventions. Another 
critical addition to the statute books is the principle of 
'command responsibility' which makes officers liable to 
prosecution for the criminal acts of subordinates under their 
command or for failing to exercise proper control, failing to 
prevent the crimes or failing to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. Un-
til now, senior army officers have enjoyed impunity; in the 
few cases where soldiers have been charged for abuses, they 
have been from the lower ranks and charged with 
'procedural errors' or 'exceeding orders', while those who 
issued the orders have escaped prosecution. Under the draft 
law now before the DPR, commanding officers will be li-
able to the same penalty as the officers who actually com-
mitted the crime. Several of the crimes included in the bill 
provide for a penalty of up to life imprisonment. The law 
excludes the use of the death penalty. 
The law also makes provision for ad hoc judges to be 
appointed who need not be lawyers who normally function 
as judges but will the appointed for their proven integrity 
and commitment to human rights . It is widely acknowledged 
that the judiciary in Indonesia is riddled with corruption. 
Judges by and large are susceptible to external pressures 
and are part of a profession with no tradition in upholding 
human rights. 
Crimes of humanity in East Timor 
The first ad hoc court that is likely to be established will 
be for crimes against humanity that were committed in East 
Timor during 1999. As we reported in our previous issue 
[TAPOL Bulletin, No 155/156, January-February 2000], 
national and international teams undertook investigations in 
East Timor in the latter months of 1999. Both teams were 
restricted to investigating crimes committed during 1999. 
The lengthy catalogue of crimes going back to the invasion 
in December 1975 and before are therefore excluded, much 
to the dissatisfaction of human rights activists around the 
world. 
The UN is under strong pressure to set up an interna-
tional tribunal to try perpetrators of crimes against humanity 
in East Timar, as it has done for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. However, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan has 
made it clear that he will not request the Security Council to 
do so if Indonesia succeeds in setting up its own court with 
powers to try crimes against humanity in conformity with 
international standards. Hence much depends on whether 
Indonesia is able, within a reasonable time, to set up a court 
properly empowered to try such cases. 
Indonesia's .Commission to Investigate Violations of 
Human Rights (KPP HAM) in East Timor published its 
findings on 31 January. The 16-page Executive Summary 
(the repo~ itself runs_ into . around two thousand pages) 
named thirty persons, mcludmg seventeen senior and mid-
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dle-ranking officers of the Indonesian armed forces and po-
lice, who should undergo further investigation The remain-
der on the list are Timorese militia leaders along with a few 
East Timorese administration officials. General Wiranto 
who was commander in chief of the armed forces gets a spe-
cial mention in the report as being the person who should 
bear responsibility 'for failing to guarantee security during 
the implementation of the two options announced by the 
government'. This makes Wiranto liable to possible indict-
ment as the one responsible for the debacle. 
The full report contains many more names of persons re-
garded as having been directly or indirectly involved in 
crimes so it is not at present possible to say precisely how 
many people are likely to face prosecution. 
From the Executive Summary it is clear that the KPP 
HAM's investigations were thorough-going and comprehen-
sive. They included systematic mass murders, torture and ill-
treatment, enforced disappearances, gender-based violence, 
forced displacement of civilians, the scorched-earth policy, 
sexual slavery and the crime of rape. The Commission dealt 
in detail with a number of primary cases including the mas-
sacre at the Liquica Church in April, the attack a couple of 
weeks later on the home of Manuel Carrascalao, the attack 
on the residence of Bishop Belo and the Dili Diocese, mur-
ders in Mahana, the massacre at the Suai church when three 
priests and at least fifty people were slain, the murder of 
Sander Thoenes, the Dutch journalist, and the killing of re-
ligious figures in Los Palos. The latter two crimes were 
committed shortly after the arrival in East Timor of the in-
ternational peace-keeping force. 
The Commission made a number of recommendations 
calling for the setting up of a human rights court, for secu-
rity guarantees for witnesses and for rehabilitation and com-
pensation for the victims and their families . It also called on 
the National Human Rights Commission to conduct investi-
gations into all human rights violations in East Timor since 
1975. In addition, it called for the 're-positioning' of the 
Indonesian armed forces to transform it into a security in-
stitution that hold human rights in high esteem as befits a 
democratic state. 
RIGHTS TRIALS 
The next steps 
Within weeks of the KPP HAM arriving on the desk of 
Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman (who was until re-
cently the chair of the National Human Rights Commission), 
the KPP HAM report had been examined and accepted as 
the basis for initiating the interrogation of witnesses and 
possible suspects in preparation for court proceedings. At 
the beginning of March, Darusman announced that these 
preparations would be completed within three months. De-
pending on the speed with which the DPR deliberates upon 
the human rights court draft bill, it is possible that an ad hoc 
court for East Timor will come into being in time to start 
trying army and police officers and militia leaders . 
But much now depends on the composition of the inter-
rogation team, the appointment of prosecutors and of ad hoc 
judges to hear the cases. Already problems have arisen over 
the decision of the attorney general to include personnel 
from the police and the military police in the interrogation 
team. The leaders of Indonesia's three leading human rights 
!lild legal aid institutions have declined invitations to join the 
team, arguing that they regard the inclusion of these officers 
as unacceptable. The attorney general knows very well that 
if these human rights activists refuse to participate, the inter-
rogation team will lose all credibility. It remains to be seen 
how this dispute will be resolved. Furthermore the UN will 
be closely monitoring developments, as will the international 
solidarity movement. 
In TAPOL's view, a successful outcome leading to 
credible investigations and acceptable courts run by persons 
of high integrity will represent an important victory for civil 
society in Indonesia. Failure to achieve this will intensify 
pressure on the UN to press ahead with the creation of an 
international tribunal. The East Timorese people who have 
suffered so much at the hands of the Indonesian occupiers 
have a right to justice; international community is morally 
bound to ensure that this happens either in domestic courts 
or before an international tribunal. • 
• continued from page 3 
Indonesia's Criminal Code. A properly constituted ad hoc 
human rights court would have powers to try suspects for a 
much broader range of crimes in accordance with interna-
tional humanitarian law. 
* Properly constituted ad hoc human rights courts 
would ensure the appointment of respected judges whose 
integrity with regard to human rights is unimpeachable and 
would be served by prosecutors and pre-trial investigators 
of similarly unimpeachable integrity. 
* The use of properly constituted ad hoc human rights 
courts [See separate item for more on moves to establish 
human rights courts in Indonesia.] would show that the 
Indonesian government will act without discrimination 
towards the Acehnese people by affording them the same 
consideration as is to be afforded with regard to crimes 
against humanity committed in East Timor. * 
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Serious blows for the military 
In February, 74 officers, among them three three-star generals, got the sack. A week later Bakor-
stanas, the security body, was dissolved, making another 110 middle-ranking officers jobless. This 
overhaul is the biggest blow so far sustained by the TN/ (the Indonesian armed forces) in the short 
reign of Abdurrahman Wahid. The moves were not unexpected, following the suspension of General 
Wiranto from his post in the cabinet. 
The military have been at centre stage in politics since 
the Suharto takeover in 1965; this overhaul is the most seri-
ous blow they have sustained for 35 years. During the 17-
month transition period under President Habibie, a civilian-
military showdown was becoming apparent at practically all 
levels of society, but the Habibie government had neither the 
legitimacy nor political will to push for reformasi within the 
TNI. It was left to the democratically elected government of 
Wahid to start taking serious steps against the military. 
The Wiranto 'suspension' 
For weeks in January, the most lively talking-point in 
Jakarta was when and how Wahid was going to get rid of 
Wiranto, Indonesia's most influential soldier. Under the new 
president, Wiranto held the position of Menko Polkam 
(Coordinating-Minister for Politics and Security), a position 
with little real power. Wiranto had lost direct command over 
the troops, which he had maintained in the Habibie cabinet 
as commander-in-chief of the TNI and concurrently defence 
minister. 
But in reality Wiranto still controlled most lines of com-
mand because the people in all the key positions were Wi-
ranto appointees. Perhaps the most important of these was 
Admiral Widodo, the present TNI commander, a childhood 
friend of Wiranto, who Wiranto appointed as his deputy 
when he was commander of the TNI. The two other key po-
sitions, army chief of staff and the commander of Kostrad 
(the prestigious reserve troops), General Tyasno Sudarto 
and Lt-General Djadja Supannan, were also regarded as 
Wiranto loyalists. 
Wiranto as the one who should be held responsible for the 
violence. The report became the symbol of a new emerging 
political system that is making a serious attempt to end im-
punity for the military. It was obvious that some groups in 
the TNI were furious and rumours of a coup d'etat abounded 
in Jakarta. [See 'The danger of a military take-over?' in 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 156, February 2000]. 
Wahid versus TN/ 
President Wahid, who was on a prolonged overseas trip, 
responded immediately by stating that Wiranto should re-
sign. During the two weeks Wahid was abroad Wiranto 
insisted that he would not resign but it soon beca:iie appar-
ent that the majority of the TNI rank and file had decided 
not to side with him in the conflict. Within hours of Wahid's 
return, Wiranto was unceremoniously sacked. To soften the 
blow, Wahid described the move as a ' suspension' from his 
post, he had been made 'non-active' . A new word has now 
entered the vocabulary, pe-nonaktif-an .. In the eyes of the 
public, Wiranto is now a spent force who confronts almost 
daily criticism and condemnation in the press. 
TNI loyalty, rotten to the core 
Wiranto had two contrasting images. In mainstream cir-
cles he was seen as the one who skilfully manoeuvred the 
Suharto transfer of power to Habibi.e in May 1998 in a 
peaceful manner. From the vantage point of the pro-reform 
however, it was the army that did nothing during the May 
1998 riots (or may even have been behind the rioting), it 
was the army that conducted the violence in East Timor in 
1999 and the army that has been behind all the upheavals 
and atrocities in Maluku, Aceh, West Papua and other . It is commonly accepted that loyalty and discipline are 
places. All the disasters since 1998 happened while Wiranto unportant values in military circles anywhere in the world 
was TNI chief. but the p~ciple of loyalty in the TNI is actually quite fee-
As soon as the KPP HAM report on East Timor [see ble. The dictator Suharto, a soldier himself, well understood 
separate article] was published, it became clear that Wi- the dangers of an army with strong discipline and loyalty 
ranto ' s days were over. The report pointed the finger at a towards their sup~riors . 'Ybenever he had to remove pow-
few dozen TNI officers and others who should be questioned erful officers, which he did all the time, it could create po-
about their role in the destruction and atrocities in East tential rebellions . Over the years, Suharto managed to 
Timor and drew attention in particular to the role of General weaken the TNI from within in a variety of ways, not least 
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by speedily switching people round. Officers were replaced 
after two years, making it virtually impossible for anyone to 
build a power base in a military unit or region. Moreover he 
created a loyalty structure based not on military skills and 
professionalism but on personal loyalty to him. The most 
recent TNI commanders, including four-star generals like 
Try Sutrisno, Feisal Tanjung and Hartono, were all medio-
cre officers who won their promotions from being brutal to 
dissenters and being loyal to Suharto. 
Wiranto was the last in line of the Suharto-pack, 
groomed in the Suharto court. When the Suharto house of 
cards crumbled, it was Wiranto who betrayed his boss. The 
Judas betrayal is happening again but this time the victim is 
Wiranto. Both Admiral Widodo and General Tyasno Su-
darto switched to the Wahid camp while Lt-General Djadja 
Suparman who made some belligerent remarks against the 
overhaul was nevertheless removed from his position. 
Djadja held the post of Kostrad commander for a mere three 
months and no one expects him to make a comeback. Su-
harto-style patronage is gradually coming to an end. 
Two weeks after Wiranto was removed, Wahid made 
another spectacular move by closing down Bakorstanas, the 
security agency [see separate article]. At one fell swoop, 
three generals and more than a hundred middle ranking offi-
cers lost their jobs. 
De-Wiranto-isation 
Key people in the Wiranto-camp have been replaced by 
reformers and officers who have pledged loyalty to the new 
government. Analysts say that discussions at Cilangkap (the 
TNI HQ) on this major reshuffle were tense but in the end, 
the reform-camp which is nowadays called the Tyasno-Agus 
Wirahadikusumah (Agus WK) duo, managed to remove all 
the staunch Wiranto loyalists. At the same time, the rem-
nants of the Prabowo camp were also ditched. Two key po-
sitions, Kasum (chief of staff of the general stafl) and Kos-
t rad commander went to Lt-General Djamari Chaniago and 
Lt-General Agus WK respectively. These are the two 
command positions with direct control over the troops. Ini 
tially, Agus WK was expected to take over as Kasum but 
many top generals regarded this as going too far. 
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It was Agus WK, while still the commander in South 
Sulawesi, who publicly demanded the resignation of Wi-
ranto and who stated that the army owes its loyalty not to 
any general but to the country and its people. Agus WK also 
said he did not believe that the problems in Aceh and West 
Papua could be resolved by military means. He also stunned 
everyone with a remark that the country has been savaged 
by militarism for too long, fuelling angry responses from his 
colleagues. Although several generals in Cilangkap were 
calling for him to be sacked, this did not happen; on the 
contrary, he was promoted. But the battle is far from over. 
The Tyasno-Agus WK duo have won this round but they 
will confront many difficulties in the near and medium term 
from disgruntled officers. 
More reforms still needed 
Some key TNI institutions have been left relatively un-
scathed. BAJS, the notorious military intelligence agency is 
still intact and Chief of Staff General Tyasno Sudarto comes 
from this outfit, where until recently he was the chief This 
is probably one of the reasons why President Wahid left 
BAIS intact because he needed Tyasno's support in the bat-
tle against the Wiranto gang. But there have been sugges-
tions that BAIS should restrict itself to military intelligence 
while matters of domestic security are dealt with by the po-
lice. 
According to reports in the Sydney Morning Herald, the 
civilian defence minister, Yuwono Sudarsono was intending 
to downsize Kopassus (the elite red berets) from 6,000 men 
to 700 but latest reports say that the cutback will be no 
greater than 700. It looks as though the plan has been 
shelved for the time being to avoid creating an explosive 
situation. 
Kopassus soldiers are combat soldiers who are trained to 
kill. They have a track record of killing and kidnapping in 
many parts of the country, including Indonesia's former 
'province', East Timor. Although according to official pro-
nouncements, Kopassus units have not been despatched to 
trouble spots like Aceh and Maluku, it is widely acknowl-
edged that Kopassus soldiers are there. Any Kopassus sol-
dier is a killing machine and is capable of creating havoc in 
a village or city neighbourhood. By all accounts, the new 
government is trying to find alternative employment for the 
surplus Kopassus soldiers. One suggestion is that Kopassus 
soldiers should join the marines and take on the task of safe-
guarding Indonesia's vast waters from piracy, illegal fish-
ing, smuggling and other illegal activities. This would means 
transforming the military into an exclusively defence force. 
Another Herculean task is the overhaul of the territorial 
structure of the army, which reaches right down to the vil-
lage and is a virtual shadow government; still worse, it is 
often more powerful than the civilian administration. It has 
been common practice for retired officers to take leading 
jobs in the provincial, district or sub-district system, creat-
ing a militarised structure. This is the last stronghold of the 
army and it could take several years before the Jakarta gov-
ernment is able to create a properly functioning, democrati-
cally accountable civilian structure down to village level. • 
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Bakorstanas and Litsus powers revoked 
The government of Abdurrahman Wahid has driven another nail in the coffin of the army's role 
with its decision to dissolve Bakorstanas which vested special powers in the army, and to end the 
pernicious anti-communist screening mechanism known as 'litsus'. 
Bakorstanas, the Coordination Body to Safeguard Na-
tional Stability, was set up in 1988 to replace Kopkamtib, 
the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. 
Kopkamtib was created by General Suharto only days after 
he crushed the so-called '30 September Movement' in 
October 1965, launching his campaign to destroyed the 
Indonesian Communist Party and all its associated organi-
sations with a combined membership of well over ten mil-
lion and, within months, ousting President Sukarno from 
power. Kopkamtib had command authority and vested un-
limited powers in army commanders at the centre and 
down to the lowest command structures to exercise control 
over Indonesian society. 
In a move to make it appear as though he was loosening 
control, Kopkamtib was replaced by Bakorstanas. Unlike 
the former agency, the new one was described as having 
nothing more than a co-ordinating function over the differ-
ent regional and local government structures to deal with 
events that posed a threat to 'national stability', with the 
army commander in charge. Free from any control how-
ever, Bakorstanas and its regional structures which are 
known as Bakorstanasda, did very much as they liked. Be-
cause of the way it operated, like Kopkamtib before it, the 
agency basically vested extra powers to the army to rule 
the roost, dealing with anything from crushing 'the latent 
danger of communist infiltration to controlling the payment 
of TV licence fees ' . Using the pretext of a 'PKI threat', it 
used its powers to undermine the POI after it came under 
the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri in the mid- l 990s 
by brand hundreds of activists as being 'PKI elements'. 
[Gatra, 18 March 2000] 
Announcing the decision to disband Bakorstanas, 
Cabinet Secretary Marsilam Simanjuntak, said that Bakor-
stanas should go because it 'was the source of too much 
trouble ' . 
But the army still retains another mechanism to watch 
over local political activity. In the early nineties, 'vigilance 
posts' (posko kewaspadaan) were set up at the sub-district 
and lower levels of the territorial command structure. 
These too need to be disbanded. 
But getting rid of these structures is only a partial solu-
tion. As long as the te~itorial role of the army remains, 
people in the localities '-".P' not be free of military interfer-
ence in their everyday liv,es. 
An end to political screening 
Litsus, the abbreviation of 'special investigations' or 
penelitian khusus ', was formalised by a regulation adopted 
in 1990. However, the system had been functioning for 
years in order to prevent anyone suspected of being a 
communist or members of their families from entering the 
armed forces, the civil service and many other sections of 
society and the economy .. 
Before the litsus system was born, people were required 
to possess 'non-involvement certificates' (Surat Keteran-
gan Tidak Terlibat), confirming that they had not been 
'involved' in the events of 1 October 1965 known by the 
term G30S/PKI. Anyone suspected of being a former 
member of the PKI or of being a sympathiser, in fact mil-
lions of people, would not be eligible for such a certificate. 
[See 'The clean-self and clean-environment witch-hunt' in 
TAPOL Bulletin No 90, December 1988 This article looked 
into the history of the term litsus.] The non-involvement 
certificate, a highly visible form of discrimination, had 
been widely condemned internationally. Being more dis-
crete, the litsus mechanism has served the same objective 
ever since without attracting international opprobrium. 
Litsus is the means by which army intelligence can de-
termine a person's 'clean-self (bersih din) or his or her 
'clean environment' (bersih lingkungan) credentials. 
'Clean-self means being 'clean' of communist antece-
dents, membership of or sympathy for the PKI. A 'clean 
environment' means not being related by blood-ties or mar-
riage to such people. Without a 'clean-self or 'clean-
environment' certificate, many sectors of society have been 
closed, including being nominated for election as a mem-
ber of parliament or the local assemblies. The first time the 
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litsus requirement was abandoned in national and regional 
elections was for the elections in 1999. 
The term litsus was first used in a Kopkamtib pro-
nouncement in 1982 when Admiral Sudomo was its head. 
Astonishingly, Sudomo, the creator of some of the worst 
mechanisms of repression during Suharto's New Order, 
was one of the first people to welcome the Wahid govern-
ment's decision to end this system, saying that the decision 
was 'long overdue' . [Kompas, 9 March 2000] 
Litsus has spawned corruption as well. In South Sulaw-
esi recently, applicants for jobs in the civil service were 
dismayed to hear that successful screening could be quite 
costly, the higher the post, the higher the price. [ Gatra, 18 
March 2000] 
Moves to end the many pernicious forms of discrimina-
tion against communists suspects have been taken in the 
past but implementation has been patchy, to say the least. 
At the beginning of 1997, it was announced that the initials 
'ET' for ex-tapol, or OT for member of a banned organisa-
tion should no longer be entered on identity cards to stig-
matise people but, according to Asmara Nababan, secre-
tary-general of the National Human Rights Commission, 
even in the past few months, the commission has received 
complaints about the initials still being used. [Kompas, 15 
March] 
Another ministerial instruction still in force dates back 
to 1981. Issued by the Minster of the Interior, it gives local 
authorities (primarily the military) powers to summon re-
leased political prisoners imprisoned after the 1965 events 
to attend indoctrination courses. lnstruksi Mendagri No. 
3211981: 'The Guidance and Monitoring of Former Politi-
cal Detainees and Prisoners from the G30S/PKI', stigma-
tises former tapols by periodically reminding them and 
their neighbours of their ' suspect' status. Wahid has re-
portedly told some NGOs of his intention to scrap this in-
struction. 
The real test now is to see whether the decisions to 
scrap these discriminatory mechanisms are properly im-
plemented everywhere. 
Life is still difficult for ex-tapols 
The continuing reality of life for 1965 former political 
prisoners was spelt out by Hardoyo wh? was ai:ested_ in 
November 1966 and spent thirteen years m detention with-
out trial. Before the 1965 events, Hardoyo was a member 
of the left-wing students organisation, CGMI, which was 
banned when Suharto came to power. 
Addressing a conference in Melbourne in March, he 
said that he is not allowed to travel between provinces 
without a permit from the governor's office. 'In essence, 
we are regarded as no more than idiots who do not have 
full control of our faculties,' he said. Conditions that have 
to be met for ex-tapols wanting to travel abroad were even 
more onerous: a testimony of good behaviour, no involve-
ment in political activities and a written guar~ntee from a 
'reliable' person or institution that s/he will return to 
his/her place of residence and not go anywher,e other than 
places mentioned in the permit application. . 
Ex-tapols may not have jobs where they ~an mfl_u~nce 
others directly or indirectly, such as teachmg, rehg1ous 
work, puppeteering, legal aid and journalism. ~or can they 
work in places where there is a large concentration of peo 
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pie or among other former tapo!s. Control even extends to 
monitoring the thoughts of former detainees who are 
warned not to display attitudes deemed to have the poten-
tial to undermine the state ideology, Pancasila. 
On release, Hardoyo told his audience, these tens of 
thousands of untried political prisoners were required to 
give a written undertaking not to promote Marxism, to up-
hold the Pancasila and not get involved in pol itical activi-
ties. They also had to forfeit their right to sue the govern-
ment for having been (unlawfully!) detained. Hardoyo said 
it was not his intention to seek compensation; all he wanted 
was to have his rights as a citizen fully restored . [Jakarta 
Post, 18 March 2000] 
1966 MPR decree must also be revoked 
Although Bakorstanas and litsus are to be revoked, a 
decree adopted by the supreme legislative assembly, the 
MPR, in 1966 outlawing the communist party and associ-
ated organisations, and banning the dissemination of 
Marxism and Leninism still remains in force .. TAP MPR 
XXV/1966 gave ex post facto ' legitimacy' to the persecu-
tion of millions of people for having been members of or-
ganisations that were lawful at the time. This viciously dis-
criminatory decree is frequently referred to by groups in 
Indonesia whose minds are still poisoned by the Cold War 
ideology that was so assiduously nurtured during the Su-
harto New Order. * 
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President wants 1965 killings investigated 
President Abdurrahman Wahid has taken the unprecedented step of publicly stated that his gov-
ernment would support any initiatives from society for the 196511966 massacres to be investigated. 
Endorsing a probe into the killings on a nationwide, 
phone-in television talk-show, President Wahid said it 
would be the government's task ' to follow up the findings 
of the investigations, to punish those ... who are found 
guilty.' In his bold initiative to force people to confront the 
evil that ushered in Suharto's New Order, Wahid also said: 
'It will be very good if the case is opened ... because 
many people claimed that the communists were guilty, but 
many others did not believe that. Therefore it should go to 
the court.' 
Recently, Indonesia has been awash with demands for 
past grave abuses to be investigated and the perpetrators 
brought to justice. But the only people calling for an inves-
tigation into the 1965 killings are former political prisoners 
whose efforts have been largely rebuffed. [See TAPOL 
Bulletin No 156, January/February 2000 for an interview of 
Sulami.] When Sulami's organisation, the Institute for the 
Study of the 1965/66 Massacres (YPKP), met members of 
the National Human Rights Commission recently to ask 
them to investigate the 1965 killings, they were told that 
this could not be done because the MPR anti-communist 
decree adopted in 1966 was still in force. 
Wahid: 'I have already apologised' 
In his televised interview, President Wahid who is 
popularly known as Gus Dur, went even further, implicat-
ing his own organisation. 'Frankly speaking, I have apolo-
gised long ago for the killings of those alleged members of 
the Communist party.' He said that members of his own 
party, the Nahdlatul Ulama, had joined in the bloodletting. 
The party at the time was headed by his father. The NU 
was, and still is, one of the biggest Muslim organisations in 
the world. 
Interviewed in a documentary made by Mike Carey 
And screened by Dateline in late 1998, a senior NU mem-
ber, Jusuf Hasjim, who is Wahid's uncle, admitted that he 
took a leading role in organising Banser, a youth organisa-
tion affiliated to the NU for the specific purpose of joining 
in the killings. He said that Hitler's Mein Kampf had pro-
vided the inspiration on how to organise the youth. 
Interviewed in the documentary, Gus Dur said that peo-
ple knew that 'it was Suharto who was involved in the 
killing of the six generals (on 1 October)' which later be-
came the justification for slaughtering hundreds of thou-
sands of people. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 153, July 1999] 
The killings which took the lives of at least half a mil-
lion people began in October 1965 when General Suharto 
ordered his crack troops, RPKAD, (now Kopassus) to go to 
Central Java and exterminate the PKI. Gangs of youths 
from various political groups were recruited, armed and 
trained by the Indonesian army to join in the killing. 
Responses to the Wahid initiative 
The question of what happened in 1965 touches many 
raw nerves. Circles close to the military and to some Mus-
lim parties were clearly unhappy, claiming that such an 
investigation 'would benefit no one'. Retired General Has-
nan Habib said people should accept the bloody event 'as 
part of history' because of 'the darkness and mystery blan-
keting the event' . [Jakarta Post, 17 March] Amien Rais of 
the Muslim party PAN, who chairs the MPR, said the 
president should 'clarify' his apology to the victims of the 
1965 purges, adding that Indonesia must guard against re-
viving the communist party and teachings. [South China 
Morning Post, 23 March] while the chair of the NU, 
Hasyim Mazadi insisted that the 1966 MPR Decree ban-
ning the PKI should never be lifted. [Media Indonesia, 20 
March] However, speaking on behalf of the Indonesian air 
force, Commodore Bachrum Rasir, said that those wit-
nesses still living 'bore a moral responsibility ... to clarify 
the event.' [Jakarta Post, 17 March] Leading figures in the 
air force were implicated in the 1 October 1965 event and 
the present leaders of the force have been pressing for a 
review of what happened, in order to clear their predeces-
sors. 
However, the leading English-language daily, The Ja-
k~rt~ Post. [l? March] was outspoken in its praise for Wa-
hid: Indonesia must count as one of the few nations in the 
world which can remain indifferent to the carnage that saw 
more than half a million of their own people killed 30 years 
~go. ' .Arguing t?at, people's acceptance of the tragedy 
. explams t~e nat10n s penchant for violence today', it said 
m c?nclus1on: 'The ultimate aim in reopening the G30S 
file ts to clear, once and for all, our conscience of this col-
lective guilt.' 
TAPOL hailed Gus Dur's statement, saying: 'At a time 
when m~ny groups in Indonesia are pressing for numerous 
?uman nghts ab~ses and killings to be investigated, it is 
important to realise that all those targeted - imprisoned 
torture, killed during the 33 years of the Suharto New Or~ 
der were victims of. the same repressive machinery which 
Suharto created, bmlt on the bones of the victims of the 
1965/1966 massacre. It is important that President Wahid 
?as ad?ed his voice .to these demands by calling for a probe 
I~to this ?1~sacre, m the face of possible opposition from 
c~rcles w1th1~ the army and other groups in Indonesian so-
ciety ~ho still bear deep, irrational grudges against the In-
donesian communist party and the leftwing movement 
which was decimated by Suharto's killer thugs.' * 
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UK companies must help remove military 
from the workplace 
While much attention is paid to the more extreme acts of repression perpetrated by the Indonesian 
military and to the high-level struggle for political dominance between military hard-liners, 
reformers, civilian politicians and civil society, it is at the grassroots where the most insidious 
repression occurs and where the role of the military has to be decisively challenged. An important 
new report highlights the particular need to end military involvement in the workplace. 
The territorial command structure of the armed forces is 
such that military personnel are stationed at every level of 
the civilian administration right down to the village level. 
One particularly oppressive aspect of this is the pervasive 
role of the military in industrial relations and in 
suppressing labour rights. 
The new report, UK Companies Operating in 
Indonesia: Responses to ethical trade issues by labour 
consultants Celia Mather and Maggie Burns confirms that 
military intervention takes many forms. Troops are used to 
quell strikes and demonstrations. Military intelligence 
officers ('Intel') are placed inside factories to spy on and 
intimidate activists. Retired army staff are employed as 
'personnel managers'. Military representatives are present 
during negotiations between management, police and 
official trades union representatives to resolve strikes. 
Local communities and families are often intimidated when 
there is a workers' protest. 
The need for ethical standards 
The report, published by the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, points out that while the ethical and 
social standards of foreign investors have gained a high 
profile in recent years, what has been missing from most 
discussions and existing Codes of Conduct is a recognition 
of the harmful affect of military involvement in the 
workplace in countries such as Indonesia. Foreign 
companies and their governments must address this issue if 
they are serious about raising ethical standards. 
This and other related issues are examined by the 
authors in their study of selected UK manufacturing 
companies with production facilities in Indonesia and of 
production facilities owned by non-UK nationals producing 
goods for the UK market. The views of all stakeholders, 
including workers and company representatives, are 
obtained where possible. The companies featured include 
C&A, Coats Viyella, Marks & Spencer, Next, Sears and 
Pentland. 
Allied to the issue of military intervention in the 
workplace is the problem of bribery and corruption 
involving 'illegal payments' to the military and civil 
authorities. Payment of bribes and levies is estimated to 
account for 15-25 per cent of production costs in the 
garments industry and up to 40 per cent in other industries. 
Workers demanding better wages and conditions 
By contrast, labour costs generally represent less than 15 
per cent of production costs. It is clearly in the companies' 
own interests to halt the financial drain represented by 
these extra-legal payments. 
No concern for workers' well-being 
The report is concerned that British firms' demand for 
consumer safety does not appear to be matched by practical 
action to protect the safety and well-being of workers. 
Core international labour standards and Indonesian national 
legislation are routinely ignored. Working standards are 
poor and wages are kept low despite the fact that 
Indonesian-made goods have historically been highly 
profitable for UK-based retailers. The authors estimate that 
if the Indonesian manufacturer PT Sindoll Pratama, for 
example, raised the wages of its staff by 75 per cent and 
passed the cost on to the UK buyer, Pentland, the cost to 
Pentland would be just £350,000 a year, equivalent to less 
than one per cent of annual operating profit. 
Some of the worst affected workers are young women 
working in low-waged, labour-intensive export industries, 
such as garments and shoes. Often, the terms and 
conditions applying to women workers are inferior to those 
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enjoyed by men and women often receive lower rates of 
pay. Women can face sexual harassment and pregnancy 
can be used as an excuse to dismiss workers. 
Britain is the second-largest foreign investor in 
Indonesia after Japan and British companies . have a 
particular responsibility to ensure that the serious issues 
raised by this report are comprehensively addressed. The 
British Government must work with the companies and 
demonstrate that the so-called ethical dimension of foreign 
policy is just as important as the commercial dimension. 
'UK Companies Operating in Indonesia' is available 
from the publishers, CllR (Tel: 020 7354 0883; Email: 
ciir@ciir.org) at £4.50. 
Draft labour law condemned 
A draft labour law which was submitted to parliament 
in February by Manpower Minister Bomer Pasaribu has 
been strongly criticised by the Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) 
and other NGOs for bowing to the wishes of the IMF and 
international capital and ignoring the basic interests of the 
workers. The draft law incorporates a number of ministerial 
decrees regulating the right of workers to form trade 
unions. Some decrees date back to the days when retired 
Admiral Sudomo was labour minister; Sudomo headed 
Suharto's notorious security agency, Kopkamtib, before 
taking on the job of controlling labour. 
Munir of the YLBHI said that the law would enhance 
the powers of the executive to intervene in labour affairs, 
instead of strengthening their independence. [Suara 
Pembaruan, 25 March] 
The YLBHI and the PBHI, both legal aid organisations 
which deal with labour rights, have made strong 
representations to the DPR for the draft bill to be rejected 
on the grounds that it would restrict the right t~ se.t up 
unions. What the DPR should be doing, they said, ts to 
ratify the 1948 International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and 
Protection of Workers' Right to Organise. Johnson 
Panjaitan of the PBHI said: 'Articles in the bill clearly 
show that the government is trying to control workers. It's a 
violation of the freedom to organise' . The fact that the bill 
gave the ministry of manpower the authority to regi.st~r 
unions would effectively allow the government to hm1t 
workers' right to set up unions. The bill was also silent on 
the right to strike. [Jakarta Post, 28 March] 
Pasaribu's appointment as minister of manpower by 
President Wahid last October attracted widespread 
condemnation from workers' organisations and many calls 
for his dismissal. Pasaribu chaired the FSPSI, the only 
trade union permitted to exist during the Suharto 
dictatorship, which invariably took the side of the 
employers during labour disputes and was always deeply 
distrusted by workers. * 
George McTurnan Kahin passes away 
On Saturday 29 January 2000 George Kahin died after a 
long illness and years of fragile health. He was in his early 
eighties and was one of the world's leading scholars of 
Southeast Asian studies. 
In the early fifties he founded the Southeast Asia pro-
gram at Cornell University, in Ithaca, upstate New York. He 
became the Aaron L. Binnenkorb Professor of International 
Studies. The Southeast Program became world famous be-
cause of its high academic standards and its valuable col-
lection of material and documents. He will be remembered 
as one of the founders of Indonesian studies and a giant in 
his field. Many of his students are now among the foremost 
scholars of Indonesian studies at universities around the 
world. 
His academic credentials are impeccable and several of 
his academic works have become classics. Indonesian 
studies as they are now being taught in academia in many 
parts of the world would not have been the same without 
George Kahin. He was one of the first post-colonial and 
anti-colonial Indonesianists as expressed in his classic work 
' Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia' published in 
1952 after years of study in Indonesia during the late 1940s 
when the leadership of the Indonesian revolution was based 
in Y ogyakarta. Many young Indonesian academics regard 
this book as the definitive work on the struggle for inde-
pendence after the second World War. It was an honour for 
Indonesian academics to be able to visit Cornell to do a 
course there or to take their PhD under the guidance of such 
a teacher. 
His last major work, written together with his wife Au-
drey: 'Subversion as Foreign Policy' exposed the disastrous 
US policies towards Indonesia in the fifties. Using de-
classified documents and interviews of political actors of the 
time, the Kahins produced an invaluable historic document 
which provoked the wrath of many of those responsible for 
the disaster. 
George Kahin was a man of character with a warm 
heart. His stand against the Vietnam War was an embar-
rassment for many in power in Washington. The Indonesia 
programme of Cornell was seen by the Suharto government 
as 'anti-Indonesia' and for many years George Kahin was 
blacklisted and unable to enter Indonesia. 
While the Southeast Asia Program became a prestigious 
academic institution with George Kahin in its head, George 
remained the humble, gentle individual he had always been. 
I was fortunate to have known him and cherish the few oc-
casions in London and Amsterdam when we met. 
We at TAPOL will fondly remember our encounters with 
George Kahin and express our gratitude to his invaluable 
academic contribution to the growth of Indonesian studies 
worldwide. Our condolences and sympathies go to his wife 
Audrey and his children. We wish them the fortitude to 
stand their loss. 
Liem Soei Liong, 
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The Nabire tragedy 
Since late last year, unfurling the West Papuan flag has occurred in many parts of the territory. In 
some places, the flag-raisers have been largely ignored by the security forces. But elsewhere, the ac-
tivity has resulted in violence and death. The events in Nabire recorded below occurred a few days 
after one person was killed in Merauke, the most easterly town in West Papua. 
For four days from 28 February to 2 March, Nabire, a 
town on the north coast of West Papua, was in a state of 
turmoil because of firearms attacks by the security forces 
on the local people. Three men were killed when members 
of Brimob, the special forces of the Indonesian police, 
opened fire on three separate occasions. At least ten Papu-
ans were wounded while a Brimob member was wounded 
by an arrow. At least sixteen people were arrested, of 
whom at least ten are still believed to be under detention. 
Confusion at the top 
The events in Nabire are symptomatic of the confusion 
between a government policy allowing people to give ex-
pression to their aspirations by peaceful actions such as 
flag-raising while the security forces regard such actions as 
a threat to security. 
According to a report by ELS-HAM, the Jayapura-
based human rights organisation, the events in Nabire oc-
curred after months of escalating tensions dating back to 1 
December last year when the local people hoisted the West 
Papuan flag, Kejora or Morning Star, alongside the Indo-
nesian flag. That date was chosen to mark the declaration 
of West Papuan independence in 1960 while the territory 
was still under Dutch control. Flag-raising is happening 
throughout the territory and the civilian authorities have 
indicated their approval, provided that the Indonesian flag 
is also flown. 
The people of Nabire have been involved in the pro-
independence struggle for many years, in the face of brutal 
oppression by the Indonesian forces of occupation. After 
the fall of the dictator Suharto in May 1998, the spirit of 
reformasi spread across the archipelago, leading to a resur-
gence of pro-independence sentiment. When one hundred 
West Papuans went to Jakarta to meet President Habibie in 
February 1999 to present West Papua's demand for inde-
pendence, Nabire was well represented. After the delegates 
returned home, they were harassed by the police who de-
clared that activities to socialise the meeting with the presi-
dent were unlawful. People in Nabire responded by creat-
ing a local militia force called Laskar Papua in March 
1999, to guard information dissemination posts set up fol-
lowing the Habibie meeting. 
The local authorities, civilian and military, were in-
formed about the militia force and nodded their approval. 
Nevertheless, the police accused them of engaging in un-
lawful activities. Laskar Papua grew in size from 50 to 
two thousand members, reflecting the breadth of local sup-
port for a free West Papua. 
Police hostility latched on to local people ' s tradition of 
sporting traditional weapons, not for offensive purposes but 
as part of the culture of mountain tribes, many of whom 
had moved north to the coastal region and made Nabire 
their home. Some of these tribesmen are members of Las-
kar Papua and are in the habit of carrying these weapons 
when on duty. 
Kejora stays aloft for three months 
The flag-raising which began on I December has been 
going on daily ever since. However, during the month of 
February, the local security forces started to level accusa-
tions at the militia and there were a number of local inci-
dents. On 15 February, more Brimob troops arrived in 
Nabire, which local people interpreted as the precursor to 
an assault on the flag-raisers . A week later, the local police 
chief wrote to the head of the local assembly warning him 
to be prepared for action 'against unlawful actions by Sat-
gas Papua' (another name by which the militia is known). 
So when Laskar members on their way to the flag-
raising on 28 February were attacked by Brimob troops, 
this it was seen as a premeditated action. The troops 
opened fire after seizing and destroying some of the tradi-
tional weapons. Menase Erari, (30), a local government 
official and a student at the State Administration College, 
was hit in the face and died instantaneously. A witness said 
that the victim had been shot from a range of l 0-15 metres. 
Unfortunately, the witness was mortally wounded two days 
later. 
The following day, troops opened fire near the flag 
raising; a number of people were wounded, of whom seven 
were hospitalised. During a scuffle, one Brimob member 
was seriously wounded by an arrow. 
On 1 March, as news of Erari' s death spread, angry 
crowds gathered and marched in protest and mounted a 
siege around the Nabire police headquarters. Once again, 
police opened fire. Maksimus Bunay Umur, 27, was shot 
dead. He had been shot and slightly wounded two days 
earlier but was fit enough to go out onto the streets again. 
Elsewhere, people cut down trees which they used to block 
roads leading into the town. Sixteen people were arrested 
on suspicion of being members of Laskar Papua. Mean-
while, police claimed that Erari had not been shot by them 
but by a Laskar member to incite people against the secu-
rity forces. They claimed that the bullet that killed him was 
not regular army issue. There has been no independent 
autopsy of the victim's remains. 
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On the following day, Brimob troops travelling in con-
voy to clear road blocks once again opened fire near the 
flag raising. People fled in all directions, including some 
who were carrying the remains of Maksimus, in prepara-
tion for burial. Willem Manimwarba, 37, was shot in the 
arm and thigh. He died the following morning from loss of 
blood; his wife complained that he had not been looked 
after properly in the hospital where he was taken. 
On 7 March, when ELS-HAM investigated the tragedy, 
ten people were listed as still being held, of whom two are 
teenagers. 
Police torture detainees 
Yance Pekei, a 21-year old man, a militia member who 
was detained by the police for five days, described his 
maltreatment and torture. He was arrested by Brimob on 
28 February on his way home. When they discovered that 
he was armed with traditional weapons, he was beaten, 
thrown to the ground, kicked, then driven to Nabire police 
headquarters. During five days of incarceration, ~ieces of 
plastic were bound round his middle finger and his shoul-
der, then set on fire. As the plastic melted, it penetrated the 
skin. On another occasion, an earlobe was pierced with a 
stapler. On the fifth day, he was struck repeatedly in the 
chest with a rifle butt; after falling unconscious with blood 
streaming from his mouth and nose, he was taken to hos-
pital. Three days later relatives arrived to take him home. 
Yance told ELS-HAM that about thirty people were 
being held by the police at the time, many of whom were 
subjected to similar forms of torture. * 
Papuan Congress rejects 1969 Act 
A Papuan Congress has unanimously rejected the so-called Act of Free Choice held in 1969 which 
consigned their country to the mercies of an Indonesian occupation. Flag-raisings continue in many 
places and are expected to reach a climax on 1 May. More subversions trials are expected to be held. 
Five hundred people, representing communities 
throughout West Papua, attended a four-day Papuan Con-
gress in Port Numbay (the Papuan people's name for their 
capital city) and unanimously supported a declaration re-
jecting the Act of Free Choice held in 1969 which led the 
United Nations to recognise the territory's integration into 
Indonesia. The Final Declaration said: 
'The West Papuan people denounce the transfer of sov-
ereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia via the UN ... 
and consider it to be unlawful. This transfer had the ap-
proval neither of the Papuan people nor the National 
Council of West Papua which was the only body with the 
power and authority to determine the fate of the Papuan 
nation. ' 
It pointed out that the 1969 Act was conducted in vio-
lation of the New York Agreement of 1962 which stipu-
lated that it should be held 'in accordance with interna-
tional practice'. Less than one per cent of the population 
were allowed to take part. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 156 for 
an analysis of the Act] Since then, the people have experi-
enced inhuman brutality, human rights abuses, murder, 
rape, ignorance, impoverishment and social and judicial 
injustice, tending towards ethnic and cultural genocide. 
'We have therefore chosen independence, to separate 
ourselves from the Indonesian unitary -state, as was con-
veyed to the reformasi cabinet of President Habibie on 26 
February 1999.' 
The declaration, which was signed by Theys Eluay who 
heads the council of tribal peoples in West Papua, Tom 
Beanal, head of the Lemasa Tribal Council of the 
Amungme people, and representatives and NGOs from all 
parts of the country, pledged that dialogue and other peace-
ful and democratic means would be used to win the ap-
proval of the Indonesian government. The Congress set up 
a Papuan Presidium Council charged with preparing a 
much bigger congress held in April. 
Nine accused of plotting against the state 
Irian Jaya chief of detectives, Colonel Tukamo, has 
meanwhile announced that nine people, all of them mem-
bers of the Papuan Presidium Council, have been named 
as suspects for allegedly plotting against the government. 
The nine are: Theys Eluay, Father Herman Awom, Isaac 
Ayomi, a university lecturer, planning board secretary Don 
Al Flassy, former political prisoner John Mambor, former 
councillor Beatrix Rumbino and student leaders Mar-
tinus Werimon, Barnabas Yufuway and Laurens Me-
hue. 
They will face charges for involvement in three inci-
dents: a gathering on 12 September 1999 at the home ·of 
Theys Eluay when it was decided to unfurl the Morning 
Star Flag on 1 December, the unfurling of the flag on 1 
December and the convening of the Papuan Congress from 
23 - 26 February 2000. Tukamo said they would be 
charged under articles 106 (rebellion, maximum penalty 
twenty years), 110 (conspiracy to rebel, also 20 years) and 
154 (hostility towards the government, maximum penalty 
seven years) of the Criminal Code. Two other Papuan 
leaders, Tom Beanal and Willy Mandowen, are being 
questioned, the policeman said. [Jakarta Post, 17 March] 
. ~everal of the men listed above are already on trial for 
ra1smg the West Papuan flag on several occasions in mid 
1999: Two separate trials commenced at the end of January 
and m early February but no reports have been received 
about the proceedings. * 
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UK involved in TNI misuse of ICRC emblem 
The Indonesian army, helped by the British military attache in Jakarta, a former SAS officer, were 
involved in a military operation in West Papua in 1996, during which an International Red Cross 
(ICRC) plane was used to deceive villagers, many of whom were then shot dead. These are the con-
clusions of an independent investigation commissioned by the ICRC following revelations in a TV 
documentary shown last July in Australia and Switzerland. 
The tragic incident occurred in the village of Ngese-
lama, in the central highlands of West Papua on 9 May 
1996, in the concluding stages of the four-month hostage 
crisis. A white plane, one of the aircraft which had been 
used for months in the region by the ICRC which had 
flown in supplies for the hostages and tried to mediate with 
the hostage takers, was mistaken by the villagers as being 
on a Red Cross mission. As they rushed out to greet the 
aircraft, armed westerners emerged from the plane, in-
cluding a woman apparently impersonating an ICRC offi-
cial who had been involved in the negotiations, and opened 
fire, killing many villagers. 
At the time of the incident, the deception was known to 
have taken place but it was only after the Jayapura-based 
NGO, ELS-HAM, thoroughly investigated the incident and 
the Four Corners programme broadcast a documentary 
entitled Blood on the Cross made by Mark Davies, in July 
1999 that the International Committee of the Red Cross 
decided to appoint an independent consultant to conduct an 
investigation. The devastating results of the investigation 
were made public in March this year. 
Eleven hostages were taken by the OPM, the Free 
Papua Organisation, in January 1996, in an attempt to draw 
international attention to their neglected struggle. Four 
British scientists and a Dutch couple were among the hos-
tages, as well as four Indonesian scientists. They were fi-
nally rescued on 15 May 1996 by Kopassus troops, though 
two of the Indonesians were killed moments before the 
rescue. [See TAPOL Bulletin, Nos 133, 134 and 135, Feb-
ruary, April and June, 1996 and No 153, July 1999] Al-
though the international media gave extensive coverage to 
the hostage-taking while the foreigners were still being 
held, the moment they were freed, interest waned although 
it was clear that villagers in the surrounding region would 
be hounded by the Indonesian army in their efforts to cap-
ture the OPM members involved. Despite reports that vil-
lagers nearby were known to have been killed, neither the 
British nor the Dutch governments showed any interest in 
conducting investigations, despite calls from TAPOL and 
other organisations. 
'Perfidious use' of ICRC emblem 
The ICRC consultant, Piotr Obuchowicz, said in his re-
port that although he had met local people and NGOs as 
well as British and Dutch diplomats, he had been unable to 
meet Major-General Prabowo Subianto, the commander of 
the army's elite corps, Kopassus, who headed the operation 
to free the hostages, or Ivor Helberg, who was the military 
attache at the British embassy in Jakarta at the time and 
who was present in West Papua during the hostage crisis. 
Helberg is a former SAS colonel. 
The findings make it clear that armed westerners were 
on board the white helicopter and says that 'a serious and 
transparent investigation by the relevant government 
authorities' is needed to determined who they were. British 
special forces (SAS) were known to be in the area. The 
report declares that 'it is ... certain that western advisers, 
including Mr Ivor Helberg, helped the Indonesian armed 
forces prepare the operation'. Following the screening of 
the documentary, the Foreign Office again denied SAS 
involvement in the operation but the London Times was 
told by authoritative sources close to the regiment that four 
to six of its members had indeed participated. [The Times, 
13 July 1999] 
On a visit to Jakarta in March this year, the ICRC di-
rector-general, Paul Grossreider said that the ICRC inquiry 
found that 'military forces made perfidious use of the 
ICRC's role by employing a white helicopter that could 
have been perceived by the local population as an ICRC 
helicopter'. He added: 'Use of the Red Cross emblem is a 
serious violation of humanitarian law.' [Jakarta Post, 15 
March 2000] This violation is probably unprecedented in 
the annuls of the world's leading humanitarian agency. 
The British government has repeatedly refused requests 
for an investigation into the affair made by members of 
parliament, on the grounds that sensitive security matters 
are at stake and nothing will be said about the possible in-
volvement of SAS forces in the operation. 
The ICRC's tardy response 
The ICRC itself comes in for criticism in the findings 
for failing 'to approach Papuan representatives with a view 
to verifying the allegations'. It is criticised also for being 
'tardy in approaching the Indonesian authorities formally 
and in writing' until after the publication of the ELS-HAM 
report and the broadcast of Mark Davies' documentary, 
more than three years after the tragedy. The Indonesian 
authorities have still not replied to the ICRC's letter. 
In an acknowledgement of the ICRC's low esteem in 
the eyes of the local people, the investigator said: 'Steps 
must also be taken to restore dialogue with the Papuans.' 
For many months following the hostage crisis, a swathe 
of villages were subjected to prolonged military operations 
in the region where the hostage taking had occurred; eleven 
people were killed while scores died from hunger and dis-
ease because they lost control of the gardens and hunting 
grounds. [See TAPOL Bulletin, 147, July 1998] Recent 
reports from the area indicate that military presence is still 
high and villagers continue to live in fear. • 
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Freeport comes under attack 
The world's largest copper-and-gold mine, PT Freeport Indonesia, has come under sustained attack 
in West Papua and Indonesia for its environmental and human rights conduct. Calls for its contract 
to be revised have been resisted by President Wahid and Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab, with Henry 
Kissinger, former US secretary of state, weighing in to defend the company. 
Freeport Indonesia Corporation (FIC) is owned by US 
mining corporation, Freeport McMoRan while Britain's 
Rio Tinto invested heavily in the company to fund a huge 
expansion made possible by a new Contract of Work 
signed in 1991. Ever since operations began in the mid-
1970s, the mine has been opposed by local inhabitants 
whose land rights were violated and whose livelihoods 
have been destroyed by massive levels of pollution. 
Sustained attack 
While the company is certainly accustomed to attack 
from the local inhabitants whose rights have been so mas-
sively abused, it is a new experience for it to encounter 
sustained criticism from within the government and a vari-
ety of sources in Jakarta. 
While Suharto remained in power, such concerns were 
muted. In 1995, two human rights reports - by the Austra-
lian aid agency ACFOA and the Catholic Church in West 
Papua - drew a clear connection between killings and other 
abuses near the mine, and the company but the issue was 
shelved after a visit by the National Human Rights Com-
mission. While confirming the findings of these reports, it 
refrained from making the connection with the company, 
whose reputation in those days was still sacrosanct. 
The company has been assailed in particular for its ap-
palling environmental record. An environmental audit con-
ducted by US auditor, Montgomery Watson which lauded 
the company's performance as 'exemplary' has met wide-
spread soepticism. Minister for the Environment Sonny 
Keraf drew attention to irregularities in the audit. The 
company's verbal and written responses were insufficient 
to explain these irregularities and another audit will have to 
be conducted, he said. Meanwhile, two parliamentary 
commissions have called for the contract to be revised. 
MPs who visited the mine said the company had contrib-
uted to socio-economic injustice, human rights abuses and 
political tension'. [Jakarta Post, 21 February] 
These complaints were reinforced by the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Agency (Bapedal) which accused 
Freeport of seriously damaging 133,000 hectares of land 
and polluting nearby rivers. Ali Kastella, head of the 
agency, said that the Montgomery Watson audit failed to 
reveal the extent to which the mining operations had dam· 
aged the ecosystem. [Indonesian Observer, 25 February] 
Henry Kissinger to the rescue 
Alarm bells have clearly been ringing in Washington at 
the prospect of this tidal wave of complaints. Former US 
secretary of state Henry Kissinger, a Freeport director 
whose company, Kissinger Associates rakes in more than 
$500,000 a year from Freeport in consultancy fees, arrived 
in Jakarta for talks with President Wahid. He convinced 
Wahid that Indonesia's attraction to foreign investors 
would be damaged by moves to amend the Freeport con-
tract. He also got himself appointed as the president' s po-
litical and economic affairs adviser, generously offering his 
services for free. Following these talks Foreign Minister 
Alwi Shihab said the government rejects calls for the con-
tract to be amended. [Jakarta Post, 6 March] But calls for 
change continue to be voiced. Donna Woodward, a former 
US diplomat in Indonesia, has urged Indonesian officials 
not to be intimidated by 'well-dressed international bullies 
like Kissinger into believing that challenging suspect con-
tracts and seeking re-negotiation will necessarily harm In-
donesia's competitive standing as a location for invest-
ment'. [Jakarta Post, 21 March] 
US ambassador Robert Gelhard, has also rallied to the 
company's defence, denying Freeport culpability for hu-
man rights abuses and saying that the military should be 
investigated. But TNI spokesman, Vice Air Marshal Graito 
Usodo rejected this 'one-sided view', saying (quite cor-
rectly!) that the TNI was present in the area 'precisely in 
order to protect a vital enterprise'. [ Republika, 4 March] * 
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